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The major thrust of the present paper is to call for 
thought on the historiography of mathematics, partly by sug- 
gesting a number of “laws” of conceptual change in mathematics 
which may be tested against the increasingly rich research in 
the history of mathematics. Raymond L. Wilder in his Evolution 
of Mathematical Concepts [A17, pp. 207-111 has suggested and 
supplied evidence for ten “‘Laws’ Governing the Evolution of 
Mathematical Concepts” which he believes “worthy of study with 
a view to their justification or refutation.” The alternative 
“laws” I have suggested below have arisen mainly from the inter- 
actions between my own research in the history of mathematics 
and my readings in authors concerned with the historiography 
of science. They are put forth in the same spirit as 
that of Professor Wilder yet with more tentativeness than the 
word “law” usually implies. A fuller explication of these 
“laws” as well as some of the evidence which has provided me 
with the differing measures of confidence with which I have 
suggested them was published in HM 2, 161-166 as a revision 
and expansion of the thoughts distributed in a manuscript for 
the Boston conference. 
1. New mathematical concepts frequently come forth not 
at the bidding but against the efforts, at times strenuous ef- 
forts, of the mathematicians who create them. 
2. Many new mathematical concepts, even though logical- 
ly acceptable, meet forceful resistence after their appear- 
ance and achieve acceptance only after an extended period of 
time. 
3. Although the demands of logic, consistency, and rig- 
or have at times urged the rejection of some concepts now ac- 
cepted, the usefulness of these concepts has repeatedly forced 
mathematicians to accept and to tolerate them, even in the face 
of strong feelings of discomfort. 
4. The rigor that permeates the textbook presentations 
of many areas of mathematics was frequently a late acquisition 
in the historical development of those areas and was frequent- 
ly forced upon, rather than actively sought by, the pioneers 
in those fields. 
5. The “knowledge” possessed by mathematicians concern- 
ing mathematics at any point in time is multilayered. A “met- 
aphysics” of mathematics, frequently invisible to the mathe- 
matician yet expressed in his writings and teaching in ways 
more subtle than simple declarative sentences, has existed and 
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can be uncovered in historical research or becomes apparent in 
mathematical controversy. 
6. The fame of the creator of a new mathematical concept 
has a powerful, almost a controlling role, in the acceptance of 
that mathematical concept, at least if the new concept breaks 
with tradition. 
7. New mathematical creations frequently arise within, 
and depend in the mind of their creators upon, contexts far 
larger than the preserved content of these creations; yet these 
contexts, for all their original importance, may impede or even 
prohibit the acceptance of the creations until they are re- 
moved by the mathematical community. 
8. Multiple independent discoveries of mathematical con- 
cepts are the rule, not the exception. 
9. Mathematicians have always possessed a vast repertoire 
of techniques for dissolving or avoiding the problems produced 
by apparent logical contradictions and thereby preventing crises 
in mathematics. 
10. Revolutions never occur in mathematics. 
These “laws” may most appropriately be viewed as hypotheses 
(or questions) that may be put to the test by historical research. 
Professor Koppelman’s interesting paper on “Progress in Mathemat- 
ics” seems to share with my essay the broad goal of attempting 
to discern patterns of change in the history of mathematics, 
although her specific goal is quite different. Readers of our 
two papers may wish to explore the apparently different positions 
we take on whether revolutions occur in mathematics. My denial 
of their existence is based on a somewhat restricted definition 
of “revolution” which in my view entails the specification 
that a previously accepted entity within mathematics proper be 
rejected. Given this limitation, I suggest that the examples 
from her class V: Conceptual Generalization are not properly 
called “revolutionary.” Thus her example of the creation of 
non-Euclidean geometry was not revolutionary for it did not 
lead to the rejection of Euclidean geometry. I would admit that 
it did lead to a revolutionary change in views as to the nature 
of mathematics, i.e., a revolution in the philosophy of mathema- 
tics, but not within mathematics itself. 
